University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

6-13-2012

Patient Care Provider Safety: Examining one intervention to
reduce hospital violence
Paul Leslie Ford
University of South Florida, pford@tgh.org

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons, Nursing Commons, and the Public Health Education and
Promotion Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Ford, Paul Leslie, "Patient Care Provider Safety: Examining one intervention to reduce hospital violence"
(2012). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/4042

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Digital Commons @
University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Patient Care Provider Safety:
Examining a Training Intervention to Reduce Hospital Violence

by

Paul Ford

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Environmental and Occupational Health
College of Public Health
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Jay Wolfson, DrPH.
Raymond D. Harbison, Ph.D.
Steven P. Mlynarek, Ph.D.
Barbara Langland Orban, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
June 13, 2012
Keywords: De-escalation, Self-defense, Patient Care, Healthcare, Anger
Copyright © 2012, Paul Ford

Dedication
To all the patient care providers and support staff of Tampa General Hospital.
Tampa General Hospital is an organization committed to the healing of the sick and
injured with kindness and respect.

Acknowledgments
Thank you, family, friends, and colleagues who supported, encouraged, and made
this possible.
Dr. Wolfson was invaluable as a guide, a mentor, a friend, and a teacher. I could
never have survived without his wisdom, sense of humor, and encouragement. Thank
you to the University of South Florida for the opportunity and all the professors who
worked to provide such a positive experience.
Thank you to my leaders at Tampa General Hospital: Mr. Hytoff, Deana Nelson,
and Cheryl Eagan. Their leadership has demonstrated to me the courage and strength
necessary to take and persevere through the toughest challenges. Their caring and faith
in my eventual success helped chart my course through this endeavor and going forward.
I have been very blessed and thank God for all those who were part of this
journey.

Table of Contents
List of Tables

iii

List of Figures

vi

Abstract

v

Chapter 1: Introduction
Tampa General Hospital Information
Violence as a Public Health Issue
Violence as a Hospital Issue
International Hospital Violence
Statement of the Problem
Purpose of Study
History of this Study
Hypothesis
Delimitations of the Study
Limitations of the Study
Unique Nature of this Study

1
1
3
5
6
6
7
8
8
9
9
10

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Media Coverage
Frequency of Hospital Violence
Underreporting
Impact on Care Providers
Impacts of Verbal Assaults
Impacts of Physical Events
Examples of Patient and Visitor Violence
Violence Constructs
National Institute of Justice Violence Workshop
Conceptual Models of Violence
Risk Factors Related to Violence
Definitions of Violence, Abuse and Aggression
Reporting and Increases of Violence
De-escalation and Self-defense Training
Conclusion

13
13
14
15
16
17
17
18
19
20
26
30
34
37
39
41

Chapter 3: Methodology
Theory Driven Model Study Design
Hypothesis Review
Method to Test Hypothesis

42
43
44
45
i

Study Questions
Assumptions of the Study
Process Study as Quality Improvement Activity
Application to the Systematic Methodology Process
Application of Methods, Models, and Theories
Stakeholder Analysis
Iskikawas Diagram of Hospital Violence
Logic Model
Department Participation Process
Data Collection Process
Code Gray Data Collection Tool
Code Gray Investigation Procedures
Intervention Design
Internal Controls for Validity
Statistical Methodology

46
46
47
49
50
50
52
52
53
54
56
56
57
60
61

Chapter 4: Results
Code Gray Baseline Data
Statistics Adjusted for Patient Days
Histogram Monthly Results
Similar Results to First Six Months of Cardiac Unit
Wilcoxon Before and After
P-Scores for Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
Regression Analysis
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Final Statistical Model
Physical and Verbal Comparisons
Conclusions

63
63
64
66
71
73
75
75
76
76
77
79
79
80

Chapter 5: Conclusions
Strengths and Weaknesses of this Study
Strengths
Weaknesses
Recommendations for Future Research
Reasons for More Research

82
82
82
83
83
85

References

87

Appendix A

96

ii

List of Tables
Table 1.1: Results from Emergency Department Violence Study

5

Table 2.1: Occupational Risks

31

Table 2.2: Hospital Risk Factors

32

Table 3.1: Evaluation Stakeholders and Related Concerns

51

Table 3.2: Logic Model to Examine Violence on a Patient Care Unit

53

Table 3.3: Kruskall-Wallis Comparison

62

Table 4.1: Baseline Data from Event Reports

63

Table 4.2: Baseline Data for Participating Units

64

Table 4.3: Overall Rate Statistics-Codes per Patient Days on Unit

65

Table 4.4: Second Kruskall-Wallis Chart

72

Table 4.5: Combined Before and After Kruskall-Wallis Tables

72

Table 4.6: Pre-Post Change Comparison (median, range)

75

Table 4.7: Overall Change 24 Months

76

Table 4.8: Comparison Units

77

Table 4.9: Cardiac Care Unit

77

Table 4.10: Eldercare Unit

77

Table 4.11: Final Regression Statistics

78

iii

List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Tampa General Hospital

1

Figure 2.1: Violence Theory Model

27

Figure 2.2: CDC Public Health Model I

28

Figure 2.3: CDC Characteristics of Violence Model II

28

Figure 2.4: Riches Violence Triangle

29

Figure 3.1: Baseline Code Grays per Patient Comparisons

43

Figure 3.2: The Logical and Systematic Methodology Process

49

Figure 3.3: Iskikawas Diagram

52

Figure 4.1: Baseline Code Grays per Patient Comparisons

65

Figure 4.2: Patient Day Rate Comparisons

66

Figure 4.3: Before and After Averages

67

Figure 4.4: Scatter Plot 1

68

Figure 4.5: Scatter Plot 2

68

Figure 4.6: Scatter Plot 3

69

Figure 4.7: Line Graph of Comparison Units Averages

69

Figure 4.8: Line Graph of Experimental Unit Averages

70

Figure 4.9: Line Graph of Eldercare Unit

70

Figure 4.10: Cardiac Unit Trendline

71

Figure 4.11: Overall Hospital vs. Experimental Units

73

Figure 4.12: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Before and After for Cardiac

74

Figure 4.13: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Before and After for Eldercare

74

Figure 4.14: Comparison Unit Verbal vs. Physical Percentages

79

Figure 4.15: Experimental Unit Verbal vs. Physical Percentages

80

iv

Abstract
In the summer of 2009, Tampa General care providers met with Hospital
Administration to express concern that violence on care units was a growing problem and
making it difficult to provide quality care. Nurses stated that such violence was one
important reason many of their peers choose to retire. Administration took this situation
seriously and formed a committee to gather information and submit suggestions to reduce
the violence. The committee consisted of representatives from several nursing units,
human resources, risk management, security, and administration. Duties assigned
included investigation of the actual number of reports on all units and trends. The
committee was also charged with the production of a report regarding reviewing other
hospital data, literature review, and developing recommendations.
Internal reports indicated that the total prevalence of reported violence as well as
the incidence per patient had increased annually since 2005. The hospital reports
contradicted the national literature regarding the emergency department (ED) and
psychiatric unit (Psych) being the two hospital units with the highest number of violent
events. One possible reason for the difference is that these departments require all care
providers to attend de-escalation and self-defense classes annually. Based on these
findings, the researcher developed and adapted training similar to that of the ED for other
units reporting aggressive, abusive, and violent patients. The committee approved a draft
plan for implementation. Following presentation to Nursing Administration, some
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modifications were made, and the Internal Review Boards of the hospital and University
of South Florida (USF) approved the project.
The hypothesis tested in this study was whether training in de-escalation and selfdefense modifies providers’ behaviors to prevent or reduce aggressive, abusive, or violent
behavior by patients and visitors. The independent variable was training. The dependent
variable was requests for assistance with unruly, angry, or violent patients or visitors.
Event reports of the year prior were used for historical comparison. Event reports for the
experimental period were assembled subsequent to the training for comparison.
Nursing Administration selected two units to receive the training intervention.
The two units selected were neither the worst nor the best in numbers, but rather the
middle. Nursing required that all training be scheduled in normal department meetings
and that Nurse Managers of the units agree to participate. The research design presumed
that at least 85% of care providers on a unit would attend the training. Schedules were
developed to accommodate all care providers. The training was presented during June of
2010.
Experimental and comparison units were monitored each month for the number of
reported violent events (Code Grays) on each unit. During the fourth months of
monitoring, there was a data spike in the Cardiac Care unit. No action was taken until
another spike occurred during the sixth month. It was determined that an error had
occurred that partially invalidated the data from the Cardiac Care unit: the 85%
participation rate among staff had not been reached. Monitoring continued for 12 months
after the training. The Eldercare unit showed reduced requests for assistance. Overall, the
Cardiac Care unit increased requests for assistance from the year before. Results were
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adjusted for patient census. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testing was performed and
displayed using box plots to show how far the median changed during the research from
one group to the next. The analysis compared prior year with the year following the
interventions, and indicated that there was a movement toward a reduction of Code
Grays. To determine if there was a difference between comparison units and
experimental units 12 months after the training, Poisson Regression Analysis was
utilized. When the comparison units were set as the reference, Poisson analysis indicated
the events were decreasing on both units. The Cardiac Care unit did not have a
statistically significant p value. The Eldercare unit had a p value of .019.
In conclusion, the results are mixed and statistically inconclusive. From the care
providers’ perspective, any reduction in violence is significant. The data regarding the
training interventions indicates that there was an empirical, albeit not a statistically
significant, change in Code Gray reports. Training may have reduced the violence on the
Eldercare unit by nearly half.
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Chapter1: Introduction
Several respected Nursing leaders met with Tampa General Hospital (TGH)
Administration in June of 2009 to express concern that violence on patient care units was
a growing problem. They believed that violence was increasing and making it difficult to
provide quality care. Nurses stated that such violence had been one reason contributing
to retirement of peers. Administration took this situation seriously and decided to form a
committee to gather information and submit suggestions to reduce the violence. The
researcher suggested the development of training similar to what had seemed to be
effective in the emergency department. The suggestion was approved as a trial study to
determine the effectiveness of de-escalation and self-defense training on reducing abuse,
aggression and violence on patient care units.
Tampa General Hospital Information

Figure 1 - Tampa General Hospital
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TGH has a zero tolerance policy for violence. Security is expected and monitored
to be on scene of a violent or potentially violent situation in less than two minutes.
Charge nurses and the emergency department historically attend a 60-minute deescalation and hands-on self-defense training. This training includes how security should
respond and how administration supports them. None of these factors changed before,
during, or after this research. All of these practices have been part of the philosophy of
TGH since 2005 and are still in place.
The following facts about TGH may influence the number and severity of violent
events that occur. Tampa General Hospital is:
•

A 1051 bed acute care hospital—the number of patients and visitors in
such a large hospital increases the random chance of violence

•

A level 1 trauma center—criticality of patients and its emotional impact
could increase number and severity of violence

•

The primary teaching hospital for the University of South Florida, College
of Medicine—residents learning how to approach difficult patients could
increase number and severity of violence

•

The region’s only Burn Center—patients and families are similar to
trauma patients in criticality

•

An adult Solid Organ Transplant Center—life and death decisions on
transplant recipients could increase violence

•

The Provider of Inpatient Specialized Rehabilitation Services—frustration
from heightened expectations and difficulty of rehabilitation may
contribute to violence

2

Administration was presented with a literature review to aid its decision to
implement the trial study. The literature reports included a 2009 study from The Journal
of Nursing Administration, which found that over the preceding three years, 50 percent of
Emergency Department nurses experienced some type of physical violence – such as
being shoved, hit, kicked and spat upon - and 70 percent experienced verbal abuse.
Also, in 2001, the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 48
percent of all non-fatal injuries from occupational assaults and violent acts occurring in
the United States occurred in health care and social services settings. This report stated
that health care workers are at a higher risk of violence than workers in any other
employment sector, indicating the seriousness and severity of such violence. A quotation
from the Journal of Advanced Nursing stated: “Violence has a detrimental effect on
nurses’ psychological, cognitive, emotional, behavioural and spiritual well-being and a
negative impact on public healthcare costs and organizational effectiveness.” (Lyneham,
2000: Mayhew & Chappell, 2001) Consequences of violence on a hospital unit not only
affect nurses but also reduce all care providers' effectiveness and harm patient care.
(Henderson 2003, 1). The alarming trend is that violence is most often committed by
patients (Findorff, McGovern, Wall, Gerberich,& Alexander, 2008).
Violence as a Public Health Issue
The Surgeon General’s Healthy People Report in 1979 included the first public
United States governmental recognition that violence was a Public Health issue.
Previously, violence had only been addressed as a criminal, psychological,
anthropological or sociological problem. In response, the Department of Health and
Human Services established goals for violence prevention and included them in their
3

report, Promoting Health/Preventing Disease: Objectives for a Nation. In 1983, the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began epidemiological studies and
established the Violence Epidemiology Branch. Subsequently, C. Everett Koop’s
"Workshop on Violence and Public Health" emphasized the importance of public health
professions' involvement in prevention of violence. By 2000, a new Healthy People
report by the Surgeon General listed violence and abusive behavior as one of 22 top
public health priorities and called for “cooperation and integration across public health,
health care, mental health, criminal justice, social service, education and other relevant
sectors.” The CDC then established the Division of Injury Epidemiology and Control for
Violence.
Violence as a public health issue has many manifestations. The CDC's recent
document, “A Timeline of Violence as a Public Health Issue,” specifies that issues of
suicide, interpersonal violence, youth violence, intimate partner violence, violence
against women, child maltreatment and dating abuse are all issues of public health. The
CDC is addressing these issues by having established the Violence Epidemiology Branch
and a new Division of Violence Prevention, having acquired funding for youth and
intimate partner violence, violence against women and child maltreatment prevention,
and having developed programs for suicide and interpersonal violence. Their
publication, VIOLENCE, Occupational Hazards in Hospitals, recognizes negative
impacts such as low worker morale, heightened job stress, increased employee turnover,
and reduced trust of management, coworkers, and hostility in the work environment.
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Violence as a Hospital Issue
One common element of most violence is that all seriously injured victims end up
in the hospital. Victims’ injuries and emotions, as well as possibly associated situational
threats, become part of the hospital occupational environment. Acknowledgement of such
potential for problems mandates that hospitals plan and implement mitigation along with
control and response procedures (Johnson, 2006, 100).
The magnitude and scope of violence in hospitals, particularly in emergency
departments, is illustrated by a study conducted by the Emergency Nurses Association
between May 2009 and February 2010. Titled "Emergency Department Violence
Surveillance Study," this endeavor reported the following data about hospital violence:
Table 1.1: Results from Emergency Department Violence Study
Questions

Percentage of Staff in agreement

Violence perpetrated by patients and their relatives

97.1

Violence occurred in patient rooms

80.6

Violence occurred in corridors, hallways and elevators

23.2

Violence occurred at nurses’ stations

14.7

Violence was against emergency nurses while they
were triaging a patient

38.2

Occurred while restraining or subduing a patient

33.8

Occurred while performing invasive procedures

30.9

Male nurses reported being victims

15

Female nurses reported being victims

10.3

Violence occurred in large urban areas

13.4

Violence occurred in rural areas

8.3
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As early as 2007, Donna Mason, then President of the Emergency Nurses
Association (ENA), foresaw the critical nature of violence in healthcare and dedicated
her term in office to reducing it. She advocated political activity by the ENA at the state
level to increase awareness and seek tougher legislation for emergency departments and
healthcare employees, with the intention to improve the working environment for all
nurses. (Mercer Ray, 2007)
International Hospital Violence
Hospital violence is not limited to the United States. During a recent 12-month
period, a Swiss study revealed that 72 percent of nurses had experienced verbal patient
and/or visitor violence, and 42 percent had experienced physical patient and/or visitor
violence (Hahn, 2010). Within the last few years, an Australian study of 94 nursing wards
in 21 hospitals reported 65 percent of nurses had perceived emotional abuse during their
previous five shifts at work. (Roche, 2007) The China Daily reported that during one
period in 2007, because of violence and attacks on physicians, policemen were stationed
in and around the Shanghai Minhang District Central Hospital (Li, 2007). A Turkish
study of 290 hospitals reported that 80.3 percent of nurses had faced verbal abuse, and
that it had decreased their professional performance (Oztunc, 2006). Violence on patient
care units is both an international and a growing problem (Farrell, Bobrowski, &
Bobrowski, 2006, and Cowan, 2002).
Statement of the Problem
This study will explore the growing number of aggressive, abusive, and violent
acts perpetrated by patients and visitors on patient care units. Many victims of violence
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today bring with them into hospitals all the mental complexities, physical pain, and
emotional worries conducive to a continuation of violence. The challenge hospitals are
facing is how to prevent, mitigate, control, and respond to such violence within the caring
and compassionate nature of the hospital environment. Methods must be found to meet
the needs of arriving victims without claiming care providers as collaterally damaged
victims themselves.
Violence is harming patients, care providers and hospitals. Violence harms
patients by changing or reducing care providers’ attitudes toward them. The attitude and
behavior of a care provider dealing with violence on a care unit is different from one on a
unit without violence. Violence takes away from care providers’ concentration and
attention to patients. Violence in hospitals is harming the physical, mental, and emotional
states of care providers. Care providers are leaving the profession, retiring early and not
promoting patient care as a profession because of violence. Violence harms the
reputation of hospitals. The reputation of a hospital affects patient selection or nonselection for care. Reputation also influences the physician’s choice of where to practice
and helps job seekers decide where to apply and work. (Roche M, 2010, Sofield &
Salmond, 2003, Luck, Jackson & Usher, 2007)
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to determine if a one-hour de-escalation and selfdefense training, performed without overtime or call in pay, targeting all care providers
on a hospital unit can reduce violence as compared to historical records of the same unit
and concurrent comparison with control units. The reasons for pursuing the study are to
improve the work environment for patient care providers, and thereby allow for improved
7

quality of care for patients. Violence in a patient care setting can cause mental anguish
for patients and visitors as well as care providers. Time attended to and care providers
waste recovering from violence.
History of this Study
During the summer of 2009, a group of nurses at TGH convinced administration
that patients were becoming increasingly aggressive, abusive, or violent. They expressed
the concern that these violent and potentially violent acts were having a negative impact
on their work environment and their ability to provide quality patient care. Some nurses
of the group believed that this was why many of their colleagues were retiring.
Tampa General Administration formed a committee to investigate the nurses'
concerns and make recommendations for improvement. The nurses who had originally
brought this matter to administration’s attention organized the committee. Hospital
departments of Risk Management, Security, Research, Safety, Quality Improvement,
Clergy, the Emergency Department, and the Mental Health unit were asked to provide
members to the committee. The committee was titled the “Problem Patient Committee.”
Hypothesis
Hypothesis as a scientific formula using the null hypothesis follows:
µ = Number of calls to security for assistance from patient care staff.
µ1 =Number of calls for security assistance from the Comparison Units.
µ2 = Number of calls for security assistance from the Experimental Units.
Null hypothesis

Ho: µ1 = µ2

Alternative hypothesis

Ha: µ2 ≠ µ1
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If calls to security for assistance by patient care staff concerning violence is
related to care providers’ knowledge of de-escalation and perception of ability to defend
one’s self, then providing a de-escalation and self-defense training will reduce the
number of times patient care staff call security for assistance. Calls for assistance from
security before and after the intervention will serve as the measure for quantifying
violence on the patient care unit. Calls to security for assistance are documented on Code
Gray reports.
Delimitations of the Study
Delimitations are internal to the study but not within the researcher’s control.
•

This study is delimited in that the researcher may offer participation to a
nurse manager but that manager may decline participation.

•

This study is also delimited to the events reported by the care providers.
Limitations of the Study

Limitations are aspects external to the study not under the control of the
researcher. The following are some limitations of this study:
•

This study was conducted at a large teaching hospital, so findings may not
be applicable for smaller hospitals, or to other large hospitals due to
patient mix differences.

•

Reporting systems with other hospitals may not capture the same
information, so comparison may be difficult.

9

Unique Nature of this Study
There are two unique characteristics of this research. First, the intervention was
designed by hospital staff and patient care providers, and was crafted to be minimally
invasive with respect to time and limited in cost. The intervention is only one hour long
and can be presented at unit department meetings without requiring overtime or changing
care providers’ schedules. It is comprised of real care providers’ experiences, which are
easily recognized by peers. It is designed to be dramatic, engaging, and hands-on. The
intervention acknowledges the importance of teamwork, confidence, and respect, and
targets at least 85 percent of patient care staff on a unit.
Second is the research design and implementation. Numerous hospital violence
research studies rely upon retrospective, self-reported, cross-sectional design. The
inquiries embedded in questionnaires and self-reporting used in these studies rely upon
broad definitions of violence and differing timeframes. There is little information about
the validity of the questionnaires or of the self-reporting forms used in past studies
(Findorff, 2005, Hahn, 2008). This study is designed to collect quantitative data using a
quasi-experimental approach. There is no questionnaire or self-reporting. The reporting
mechanism has been stable and utilized for notification of patient and visitor violence in
the same manner since 2005. If an event report was completed, it meant that a care
provider faced a situation that was or could turn violent.
The researcher reviewed historical records for Code Grays for all patient care
units and provided the eight units with the most reported violent events to Patient Care
Leadership. Prior to the training, the researcher explained to Nursing Administration the
importance that several items related to the research remain stable during its duration.
Patient Care leadership suggested two units for experimentation and asked that the
10

remaining six be the comparison group. After the year of monthly monitoring was
completed, the researcher reviewed the comparison and experimental units to determine
if leadership (person in charge), staffing matrix (number and type of care providers per
patient), types of injuries or illness of patients treated, policies and procedures and
physical location of the units had changed. No discernible changes occurred that would
affect this study. The participating units are similar in that they all reported more
violence than the average hospital unit. The eight units all dealt with seriously injured or
critically ill patients, and with family members who demonstrated worry and anxiety.
The staffing scheduling and routine hospital issues were similar.
During the literature review, only one study was found utilizing a comparison
group. It was not a hospital based study and depended on pre and post self-reported
events. (Arnetz & Arnetz, 2000) No study was found using hospital event reports as a
data collection tool. No study was found that implemented an intervention designed to
reduce violence in a hospital.
The implementation of the intervention was organized to meet the actual working
requirements of a major hospital. Restrictions imposed by nursing leadership could be
anticipated if the intervention proved successful and was chosen for implementation at
other hospitals. The time, expense, and data collection tools are likely to be very similar
in other large hospitals.
The only example of research approaching a quasi-experimental design on
hospital-based violence was a Swiss study (2004) in which a systematic aggression risk
assessment combined with a standardized course in aggression management was
implemented on an acute admission psychiatric unit. The number and severity of the
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aggressive incidents were registered and measured. The comparison was with historical
events but no concurrent comparisons were performed. It concluded that on such a unit,
the particular combination of interventions may assist in reducing the incidence of
coercive measures, but further study was also recommended. (Needham, 2004)
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This literature review focuses on determining the extent and severity of violence
committed by patients and visitors on hospital care units. It begins by contrasting the
media portrayal of such events with studies of actual violence occurring on care units.
Next presented are studies that explain the frequency, type, and severity of care
providers’ experiences on patient units. Background material includes multidisciplinary
constructs, models, violence theory, challenges to the definition of violence,
underreporting, and recommendations from other studies, which support the intervention
in this study.
Media Coverage
In 2010, physicians were shot at both Johns Hopkins Hospital and Baton Rouge
General Medical Center and each event made headlines. In 2011, physicians were shot at
Florida Hospital Orlando and Physicians’ Regional Medical Center, each again reported
in news headlines. The popular dramatic television series "Grey’s Anatomy" depicted a
gunman in their hospital for the season six finale. These news stories and television
episodes elucidate the violence actually occurring in hospitals, yet do not fully disclose
the extent of the problem. The larger story is the ongoing violence that care providers are
subjected to by patients and visitors. This unpublicized and little known violence
disrupts hospital environments, operations and objectives, and in so doing threatens their
effectiveness to save lives and promote health.

13

Frequency of Hospital Violence
Surveys and studies have documented the frequency of hospital violence in recent
times. One such survey, by the International Association of Healthcare Security and
Safety (IAHSS), of 212 hospitals, reported 660 aggravated assaults and 2,720 simple
assaults in 2009 (IAHSS 2010). A 2009 British survey of nurses confirmed 33 percent
had been punched, 19 percent kicked, 17 percent spit on, and 8 percent had had hair
pulled. A 2003 Massachusetts Nurses Association survey reported that 50 percent of
nurses questioned were punched at least once during a two-year period, and that 91
percent of nurses reported verbal abuse in the past month. (Fierce Healthcare) These
studies demonstrate a problem exists beyond news headlines and television shows,
impacting significant numbers of care providers and in so doing impacting patients.
The International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety, the professional
association of hospital security administrators, attempts to track crime in hospitals. In
their 2004 Crimes Survey, 192 hospitals documented 7,764 crimes, while in the 2010
Crimes Survey 212 hospitals documented 14,991 crimes. The definitions of crime and
method of reporting did not change during that time. (IAHSS, 2006) This indicates
increased aggression, abuse and/or violence.
Hospitals both in the United States and internationally use the IAHSS training and
certifications to train security staff. The BASIC Training Manual and Study Guide for
Healthcare Security Officers presents a study performed by the Department of Medicine
at the University Of Louisville, which surveyed 170 teaching hospitals:
•

32% of respondents stated they had received one or more verbal threats
per day
14

•

18% acknowledged that once a month or greater, a weapon was displayed
as a result of a threat

•

43% affirmed medical staff were subject to one or more physical attacks
per month

•

70% confirmed that at least one act of violence led to a death in the past
five years (Lehman & Scaglione, pp. 12, 13-20)

This study points out that aggression, abuse, and violence committed by patients in
hospitals are both frequent and severe.
Decisions concerning the value and appropriateness of resources committed to
reduce, mitigate, and prevent such events must be based on individual hospital data.
There is no national data bank currently collecting information from hospitals concerning
violence. Consequently, it is impossible to cite definitively the frequency or severity of
this problem.
Underreporting

There is adequate data that violence is prevalent in hospitals, but also that the true
scope of the problem may be underreported. Russell Collings, a health care security
consultant who advises the Joint Commission states, “Many incidents go underreported
because they do not fall into the hospital’s definition of ‘violence’ but others are omitted
because officials do not want them to reflect negatively on the hospital’s image.”
(Hospitals & Health Networks Page 27, Howell, 2011) In 2000, the ENA published
research indicating that up to 80 percent of all abusive acts committed by patients are not
reported. Reasons cited for nurses underreporting included a) accepting such events as
part of the job, b) misunderstanding what should be reported (definition), c) fearing that
15

something inappropriate was done to provoke the attack and fear of reprimand, and d)
disliking the time it takes to complete the reports (Erickson, 2000). Another study of
nearly 8,800 nurses in 201 hospitals revealed that 70 percent of nurses experiencing
abuse had not reported the mistreatment (Duncan & Hyndman, 2001). Further, one study
suggested that nurses feel unsupported by management in relation to workplace violence,
and this influences their decision not to report. (Jackson, Claire, & Mannix, 2002)
Underreporting could be the reason a study in 2007 concluded that some hospital
administrators do not know violence occurs in their hospitals. (Phillips 2007)
Impact on Care Providers
A patient or visitor may witness or participate in a violent event but is soon gone
from the hospital. The care provider, however, remains, and may encounter violence day
after day, leading to physical, mental, and emotional hardship. The National Advisory
Council on Nurses Education and Practice (NACNEP, 2007) presented a report to the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services beginning with the following paragraph:
“Violence against nurses is a complex and persistent occupational hazard
facing the nursing profession. This violence can take the form of intimidation,
harassment, stalking, beatings, stabbings, shootings, and other forms of assault.
Nurses are among the most assaulted workers in the American workforce.
Psychological consequences resulting from violence may include fear, anxiety,
sadness, depression, frustration, mistrust, and nervousness. These consequences
can have a negative impact on nurse retention”.
(http:/bhpr.hrsa.gov/nursing/NACNEP/reports/fifth/intro.htm, p.1)
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In the same document, NACNEP stated that nurses exposed to abuse and violence
early in their careers became disillusioned with nursing. Seventy five percent of nurses
reported having been assaulted during their career, and assaults contributed to many
leaving the profession. Aggression, abuse, and violence experienced by care providers
caused them to feel incompetent, guilty, powerless, worthless, and fearful of criticism. A
2005 Maryland Nurses Association survey affirmed that 18 respondents left a job because
they feared for their safety, and 15 indicated they wanted to leave but had not done so
(Distasio, Hall, & Beachley, 2005, 38). Veteran nurses reported violence as contributing
to burnout and resignations. (Shader et al., 2001)
Impacts of Verbal Assaults
Nurses experiencing non-physical (verbal) assaults sometimes exhibit symptoms
of emotional and psychological trauma. Such assaults can lead to cumulative stress,
compassion fatigue, apathy, flashbacks, crying spells, intrusive thoughts, and nightmares,
and may culminate in increased use of sick time (Phillips, 2007). Fifty-three percent of
nurses in a verbal assault study stated they would not recommend nursing as a career
choice for their children, and 23 percent would actively discourage someone close to
them from entering the profession. (Keough, Schlomer, & Bollember, 2003)
Impacts of Physical Events
A comprehensive summation of the impact of physical violence on patient care
staff was found in an English textbook. Jonathan Shepherd, author of Violence in Health
Care, A Practical Guide to Coping with Violence and Caring for Victims (1994), divided
the effects into four categories: psychological, physical, behavioral, and long term. An
individual can suffer any one or any combination of these. Psychological effects of
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assault included depression, guilt, loss of confidence, loss of sense of professional
competence, increased feelings of vulnerability, self-doubt, unfocused anger, irritability,
generalized anxiety, and decreased concentration. Physical effects of assault included
insomnia, nightmares, and change in appetite, decreased sexual activity, and complaints
such as lethargy, headaches, muscle tension, and nausea. The behavioral effects included
increased alcohol, cigarette and drug consumption, increased startle response and
absenteeism, avoidance of patient contact, social withdrawal, loss of interest and
involvement in work, and phobic avoidance of reminders of the assault. Long term
effects included “burn out syndrome” and post-traumatic stress disorder, and possibly
resignation. (Jonathan Shepherd, 1994)
Examples of Patient and Visitor Violence
Melinda Mercer Ray provides three short examples to show how aggression,
abuse and violence are acted out in hospitals. “A young psychiatric patient hallucinates
and begins to bite, scratch, and kick whoever walks up to her. A frantic family in the
waiting room demands information and storms into the treatment area, pushing nurses
and other staff aside. Or, a drunken college student wants to fight his way out of the
hospital, pushing and spitting on anyone who does not get out of his way.” (Ray, 2007)
Ann Longmore-Ethridge supplies another vivid example. She writes of an
instance of an elderly man in the hospital for a chronic ailment. His three children visited
regularly – one of whom at one point became more insistent about almost every aspect of
his care. He leaned out of his father’s room and snapped his fingers, yelling, 'Here,
puppy!’ to obtain the nurses' attention. One evening, when a nurse came in to address his
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concerns about a certain treatment, he threw the bedpan at her. (Longmore-Ethridge,
2008)
Violence Constructs

Theories and models about possible motivations of perpetrators and causative
factors are available to guide development of interventions to reduce or prevent violence
on patient care units. Methods, constructs, theories and assumptions that might prove
helpful in refining the intervention implementation are also abundant. Collecting,
reviewing and synthesizing this information to provide insight and direction for
elimination or reduction of the violence problem on care units are foundational to this
study.
Functional and symbolic sociological concepts impact care providers’ responses
to violent events. These two different approaches are evident in the decision making
process for reporting: a care provider acting on the functional approach is likely to
follow through with a report, while one acting on the symbolic approach may or may not
do so. The functional approach defines violence as subversive of order, and as such
needs to be restrained. This approach values law and order as necessary to maintain
social stability, and seeks to reduce or eliminate violence because of perceived harm to
society. The functional approach encourages reporting as well as strict enforcement of
rules and policies against deviant actions. A care provider acting out the functional
approach may respond quickly and confrontationally, possibly neglecting to consider
individual and situational variables. In contrast, the symbolic approach defines violence
as subjective and possibly the result of cultural differences. This approach agrees that
one side of violence is subversive and must be controlled, but supposes that violence can
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be constructive in destroying an old order and constructing a new order. The patient care
provider acting out the symbolic approach may wish to wave a rule or allow some
aggressive and abusive behaviour, rationalizing that it may have been predicated by the
situation. This paradox of approaches creates inconsistencies of action by care providers.
It is also helpful for responders to understand and appreciate a care giver’s approach in
order to adjust to their responses and requested actions appropriately (Stewart and
Strathern, 2002).
Biological factors are arguably a contributing factor in violence. Thomas Hobbs,
often called the Father of Analytic Philosophy, writes in his book Human Nature in 1650
that men are naturally violent and aggressive. He supported the concept that violence is a
propensity rooted in the biology and psychology of the human. Sigmund Freud
supported this relationship between biology and violence by associating aggression and
sexuality. (Stewart & Strathern, 2002) Freud proposed that violence is a primordial force
manifested when pleasure seeking through sexual acts or pain avoidance is frustrated.
Whether man is innately violent or not is beyond the scope of this study, but the concept
holds ramifications for development and presentation of the intervention.
National Institute of Justice Violence Workshop
The National Institute of Justice sponsored a workshop on violence theory in
2007. Participants compared, contrasted and evaluated both conventional and developing
theories. Conventional scientific criteria for theory evaluation included:
•

Parsimony—simple statements with maximum explanatory power are optimal.
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•

Generality—a theory should account for as much variation in the facts as
possible.

•

Testability—testing a theory’s formulations and hypotheses should be feasible.

•

Validity—a theory’s propositions and observations of reality should match.

•

Originality—new ideas should give a better explanation of behavior than
previously available.

Participants were instructed to include the following in future violence theory:
•

A tangible principle for the concept of time and space—theories should explain
the relevance of emotional development to actions later in life as it relates to
predicting violent behavior.

•

Concreteness to reduce distortion—abstract theories are easily misunderstood and
twisted.

•

Restriction to small-scale violence—focus should be on illegitimate or deviant
violence, as opposed to acts of war.

Violence was segmented into three types. Type One violence is that ostensibly
provoked by other violence or negative conditions. An example in Feminist theory is that
violence is necessary as a response to perception that gender blocks accomplishment of
goals though legitimate channels. Type Two violence is committed to solve a problem.
Violent Structures theory rationalizes violence as exigent when a person’s sense of justice
has been violated because action is needed to correct the violation. Type Three violence
is categorized as processes, which may motivate or cause violence. Radical Ecology
theory, for instance, manifests that low exposure to lead causes violence.
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Various theories have been developed to elaborate on violence. Robert Dubin
developed Strain Theory in 1959. He maintains that violence is the result of an
individual or group taking actions outside the norm because of strains due to desire for
social or personal gain. Robert Agnew, in 1992, adjusted Strain Theory to include
individual characteristics that possibly create and control interpersonal strains. Such
attributes as temperament, intelligence, interpersonal skills, self-efficacy, social support,
association with antisocial groups, age and status are cited. When the individual’s
perceived desires are greater than their control, the Strain Theory would predict violence.
Strain Theory accords that to reduce anger, aggression and violence on a care unit, a
hospital should identify and develop methods to reduce the strains on patients, visitors
and care givers.
Another theory, Travis Hirsch’s Control Balance Theory, states that violence is
the result of an imbalance between society and an individual’s desired achievement.
When a personal achievement has priority over an institutional norm, an imbalance exists
which may propagate deviant behavior. If the individual’s perceived gain surpasses his
perceived social controls, a deviant act such as violence can result. This theory points out
that excessive control or lack of control may affect deviant behavior. Additionally, the
stronger the bond between the person and society, the less likely they are to engage in
criminal acts. Three specific actions are delineated in the Control Balance Theory:
predation, consisting of predators’ actions, deviance, consisting of deliberate
inappropriate action to demonstrate individual power, and submission, consisting of a
victim completely obeying authority. Control Balance Theory contributes to this study
by emphasizing the need for security and care provider training to control predator
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designs. Listening to and observing a patient is expounded as the best way to predict and
avert tendencies of aggression and violence. Interestingly, proponents of Control
Balance Theory show concern that while the economic stability of the 1990s moved a
significant number of people into a balanced control ratio and reduced violence, the
opposite is occurring today. They warn that the current economy is changing the balance
control ratio, which could lead to increasing violence for the next several years.
The Social Learning Theory is one of the most influential theories of learning and
development. It postulates that threatening or acting violent is often learned. The three
core concepts are: 1) people learn by observation, 2) a person’s internal mental state is
an essential part of learning and 3) learning alone does not mean the person will change
behavior. Albert Bandura added a fourth core concept to Social Learning Theory - the
ability of a person to learn just by watching the actions of others and anticipating similar
results by adopting similar actions:

“Learning would be exceedingly laborious, not to mention hazardous, if
people had to rely solely on the effects of their own actions to inform them what to
do. Fortunately, most human behavior is learned observationally through
modeling: from observing others one forms an idea of how new behaviors are
performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as a guide for
action."
-Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory, 1977 (B 2)
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This theory is important to this study because it emphasizes the need of including
behavior modeling in the intervention. It also supports actual hands-on demonstration
and practice of concepts by participants. (Cherry 2011)
Cohen and Felson proposed Routine Activities Theory, stating that criminal and
violent actions are often the result of clearly thought out rational decisions. The Routine
Activities Theory contends that for a crime, or violence, to take place, three requirements
are necessary: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and an absence of capable
guardians (Cohen, 2002). The first requirement indicates that in some circumstances the
individual arriving as a patient might be inclined to violence or aggression. The second
requirement is significant because hospitals have a reputation for allowing and
understanding socially deviant behaviors as caused by the illness or injury and not the
person. Therefore, a perpetrator may see a hospital as an environment where deviant
actions are less noticeable, and apprehension and prosecution are unlikely. The third
requirement indicates that normal routines may allow the crime to go unnoticed or not
prosecuted. Hospitals focus on patients’ and family members’ care and comfort. To
maintain a family friendly atmosphere, hospitals avoid closed and locked doors and
access control systems. Open doors and uncontrolled access create an environment that
allows many crimes to go unnoticed until it is too late to perform proper investigations.
This theory explains why hospitals can be easy targets for criminals.
Donald Black conceived Social Geometry Theory, which states that social space
and social direction are the foundations for action, rather than the individual. Social
Geometry Theory predicts that the greater the social distance between participants at the
time of the event, the greater the possibility of violence. Social distance for this theory is
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not specifically defined, but the context would indicate that it is the differences between
peoples’ economic, political and class distinctions. Social Geometry is not taken into
account when patients are admitted in a hospital. All classes, economic levels, races, and
educational levels are mixed, as people become patients in a hospital. This theory
provides some understanding that care providers need to recognize individual patient’s
social norms and attempt to make accommodations. (NIJ, Workshop, 2002)
All of these theories contributed to recommended actions and attitudes included
within the training developed for this study. The Strain Theory broadens caregivers’
awareness of the stresses and strains patients and visitors feel when having to be in a
hospital. Therefore, empathy is a key factor in de-escalation training. (Robert Dubin,
1959) The Violence Structures Theory supports another key de-escalation factor - that
negative events are cumulative and it is best to intervene as soon as possible to prevent
them from escalating. This highlights the importance of listening to and observing
signals of a patient, family member or visitor to recognize if they are experiencing
personal challenges, which might be manifested in their actions. (Stewart & Strathern,
2002) Control Balance Theory supports the intervention proposal that all care providers
must envision how their actions will be interpreted by other shifts as time passes.
Patients and visitors may observe inconsistencies and interpret them as unfair or
controlling on the part of staff. Care providers must be careful to interpret and explain
actions observed. One example of this is a night nurse allowing a visitor to sleep in a
waiting room but in the morning the day shift telling him it is against the rules and calling
security. (Branson 2005) Social Learning Theory led to the 85% participation
requirement. This theory reminds managers and leaders that one person acting
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inappropriately could become a model for others and increase deviation from desired
behaviors. The Routine Activities Theory provides insight into the importance of the
work environment and encourages review of operational tasks that could promote or
discourage deviant or violent behavior. It underscores the importance of visible security.
It also suggests proper signage about appropriate behavior. The Social Geometry Theory
can assist when deciding to what nurse or room a patient is assigned, acknowledging that
similar persons may get along better, and recognizing that the social distance between
care provider and patient may influence the actions of both parties in the healthcare
setting. Life-course, Developmental and /or Integrative Theory demonstrates the
complexity of identifying differing ethos that should be considered when communicating.
Awareness and appreciation for both the diverse and similar characteristics of theories
concerning violence provides a foundation for the development and implementation of
this study. (Gottesman & Brown. 2010)
Conceptual Models of Violence
Four models of violence will be presented. These are the Theory of Violence
Model by Jonathan Shepherd, the Public Health Model from the Centre for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), the Socio-Ecological Model also developed by the CDC,
and Riches’ Triangle Model.
The Violence Theory Model is from Violence in Health Care (Shepherd, 1994, p.
19). This model includes many existing theories and risk factors. Long and short term
influences on an individual that create the potential for violence are part of this model.
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Long Term influences: biological, individual,
family peer, school, community, society , law

Long Term violence potential: betweenindividual differences

Short Term
influences:
borded, angry,
drunk, frustrated

Life events

Short Term violence
potential: withinindividual variations

Cognitive process:
decisions, costs,
benefits, probabilities,
scrips

Routine
activities

Opportunity,
Victims

Violence

Consequences: reinforcement, punishment,
labeling, learning

Figure 2.1: Violence Theory Model (Modified from, Stewart & Strathern, 2002)
The two models which follow were developed by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. The CDC’s first model is a four-level social-ecological model (CDC,
2011). It provides understanding of what influences violence and of the impacts of
potential prevention strategies.
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Figure 2.2: CDC Public Health Model I

Societal
Community

Relationships
Individual

Figure 2.3: CDC Characteristics of Violence Model II
The CDC’s second model is designed to explain violence in terms of
characteristics within the individual, close relationships, the community and the greater
society (CDC, 2011). Factors of the individual segment of this model include biological
items such as age and health, and personal history items such as education, income,
substance use or history of abuse. Prevention strategies include educational presentations
designed to change attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours. Factors of the relationship segment
include social-circle peers, partners, and family. Prevention strategies include mentoring
and peer programs to reduce conflict, foster problem solving, and promote healthy
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relationships. Factors of the community segment include environmental characteristics
such as school, workplaces, and neighbourhoods. Prevention strategies include
marketing campaigns to foster community climate, processes, and polices to promote
healthy relationships. Factors of the societal segment may encourage or inhibit violent
actions. Prevention strategies include programs impacting the health, economic, and
education systems as well as cultural norms, social policies, and inequalities.
The final model, Riches’ Triangle Model, is widely accepted among violence
researchers. It presents the concept that the perspective and relationships of the victim,
perpetrator and witnesses define and determine the appropriateness of a violent action.
Riches, in 1998, explained violence as a triangle involving the victim, the performer, and
the witnesses. "Witnesses" in this model decide if an event is justified and appropriate.

Victim

Witness

Perpetrator

Figure 2.4: Riches Violence Triangle
This model demonstrates that violence, aggression, and abuse are understood
differently due to participants' perspectives in the situation. The performer normally
views their actions as justified and appropriate. The victim normally sees the actions as
unjust and illegitimate. Time is also held as a variable in this model. Riches model states
that the performer and victim may view their original conclusion differently over time.
However, at the moment the event occurs, each justifies or rationalizes their belief. The
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witness is not seen as an unbiased or completely honest evaluator of the event. The
witness's perceptions change depending on his/her relationships and history with the
victim or performer. The perspective of the victim, performer and witness may all be
seen as appropriate depending on the audience and the situation. Riches’ violence model
has been used to explain why violence as a sport is not shocking. The participants are
performer and victim, and the observer is the witness. They have a relationship that
justifies the violence in the name of sport as long as it is within set sports boundaries.
(Strathern & Stewart, 2004)
Hallpike in 1979 added passion as a variable to Riches’ model. (Hallpike 1979)
Progression from irritation, to aggression, to anger and verbal abuse is intensification of
differences between people’s perceptions, and the violent act is the pinpoint of absolute
collapse of controlled behaviour. Passion is often observed during acts of aggression,
abuse and violence in the hospital environment.
Risk Factors Related to Violence
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) published the
first nationally accepted list of risk factors for violence in 1996. The CDC later made
some changes based on their research, and republished the following list in 2006. The
investigator has provided hospital relationships.
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Table 2.1: Occupational Risks*
Risk Factors for all
Occupations

Hospital Situational Relationship

Exchange of Money

Gift Shops, cafeteria, pharmacies, cashiers' offices

Delivery of passengers, goods
or services

Employee buses, patient shuttles, movement of
medications, laboratory specimens and supplies

A mobile workplace such as a
taxicab or police cruiser

Home health services which go to patient homes,

Working with unstable or
volatile persons in healthcare,
social services or criminal
justice settings

Life and death situations, long care staff hours,
worry about patients and feeling the stress of both
patients and patient family members

Working alone or in small
numbers

Small pockets of employees working during some
evenings and weekends

Working late at night or during
early mornings

24/7 environment of hospitals

Working in high crime areas

Some hospitals are located in high crime areas

Guarding valuable property or
possessions

Patient belongings, narcotics, specialized equipment

Working in community based
settings

Community programs and services held at hospitals

bloodmobiles, community services

*Risk factors provided by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2002)
The following table presents the risk factors, again from OSHA, specific to
hospitals and adds mitigation activities.
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Table 2.2: Hospital Risk Factors*

Hospital Risk Factor

Relationship to Study

Lack of adequately trained, armed or
visible security guards

Security training is needed for deescalation and communications skills.

Pain and discomfort

Care givers' awareness of patients' pain and
discomfort creates concern, stress and
possible feeling of helplessness.

Family member stress and fear of unknown Family members' stress requires adequate
communication of social services
availability.
Family member anger at unclear and
conflicting policies and inconsistent
enforcement

Care providers need to demonstrate respect
by allowing for exceptions to policies and
applying them such that they are
understandable for the patient and family
member at the moment of the situation.

Cramped space

Care providers should assist patients and
visitors with seating and privacy.

Long wait times

Caregivers should explain wait times and
demonstrate concern.

Particular ailments such as head injuries,
senile and adolescents

Special training is needed for care
providers who work with special
populations.

Culture-specific grieving actions

Caregivers should allow as much culturespecific behavior as possible without
causing undue hardships on others.

Intoxication and substance abuse

Special training of and understanding by
care staff and support by security staff are
needed.

Police custody

Security involvement and support for care
staff is necessary.

Rude or uncaring presentations by staff

Intervention by other care providers and
notification of supervisors to correct
attitudes is exigent.

Victims and perpetrators at same location

Location, confidentiality, and control of
visitors must be managed.

(Example: gang members)

*Risk factors provided by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA,
2002)
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These risks relate to the complexity and scope of preventing or mitigating
aggressive, abusive, or violent actions in a hospital. Identification of the risk factors of
the patient, visitors and care providers is the first step to preventing, mitigating, or deescalating violence. Hospital Security Departments rely on incident reports to track and
trend data. If the data is not accurate due to underreporting, poor decisions can result.
The severity and frequency of events are normally part of the analysis. If one event such
as a suicide or active shooter occurs, this may create the political energy to promote
security improvements without extensive data collection. For instance, the shooting at
Johns Hopkins motivated change at Johns Hopkins and many other hospitals. The act, as
well as the publicity, created political motivation, which may prevent similar acts at other
hospitals. Minor events, such as patients verbally abusing care providers, may require
excessive instances before the political landscape is impacted enough to engage action.
This presents a dilemma for hospital security: if a hospital security department is either
expert enough or lucky enough to prevent major public events, it may be viewed as
effective and not needing to improve, even leading to budget cuts. It is also important to
remember that a single major event may create negative publicity, damaging the
institutions’ reputation and causing loss of patients and revenues.
It is paradoxical that seeking to keep information about what happened at a
hospital private also limits the ability of other hospitals to learn from such experiences.
There was almost no media attention to the shooting of a physician at Florida Hospital
Orlando, and other hospitals viewed this as an excellent control of media. Furthermore,
the ability to track and trend within a city, county, or state does not exist. Each hospital
must independently determine if violence is a problem. There is no current method to
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accurately quantify the scope and severity of violence occurring on patient care units at
hospitals across this county or internationally. Until there is collaboration and
cooperation between hospitals, data driven studies will remain sketchy. Individual
hospitals, however, are working to reduce, mitigate, or prevent violence. Some of the
actions taken by most hospitals include surveys of risk, design changes for better lighting
and visibility, awareness training, development of violence and bullying policies and
response plans, and classes to improve care providers’ communications skills with
patients and visitors. The knowledge and actions of the care provider may be the most
important elements in preventing, mitigating, and responding to violence on a patient care
unit.
Definitions of Violence, Abuse, and Aggression
There is no single definition of violence, abuse, or aggression standardized for
research purposes. Researchers define verbal or physical aggression, abuse, or violence
to suit particular purposes. Studies concerning care providers and violence in healthcare
organizations offer several unique definitions. One such definition is that of Lauretta
Luck, James Cook University, Queensland, Australia, who defines violence in terms of
subcategories of physical and nonphysical violence, where physical violence includes any
damage to person or property, and non-physical violence covers verbal abuse, threatening
language and abusive language. She points out that, “The term violence is not used
consistently in literature and frequently includes sexual, physical, emotional, or verbal
abuse, threatening behavior, and damage to property.” (Luck, 2007, p. 12) Ms. Luck’s
definition is broad and applies to research about hurt feelings or damage to property.
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Mary Findorff, School of Nursing, University of Minnesota, provides a second
and more concise definition: “Violence is broadly defined as words and actions that hurt
people.” (Findorff 2005, p. 23) Her definition is extensive in the respect that it does not
limit what causes harm to people; however, it eliminates property and items that people
might hold valuable. Morrison, in 1990, presented violence as, “any verbal, non-verbal,
or physical behavior that threatens others or property, or that actually harms others or
property.” (Hahn. 2008) Uniquely, this definition characterizes threats as a form of
violence. Susan Phillips presents a definition specific to physical assault. She states that,
“Physical assault is characterized by hands-on offensive contact or attacks ranging from
slapping and biting to rape, homicide, and the use of weapons to inflict injury with
firearms, bombs, or knives”. Her definition portrays violence broadly to allow for many
actual modalities. (Phillips, 2007, p. 210)
The Emergency Nurses Association's Emergency Department Violence
Surveillance Study seems to make the definition larger in scope by including aggression,
but limits the definition to the workplace. She defines violence as “an act of aggression
directed toward persons at work or on duty, ranging from offensive or threatening
language to homicide. Workplace violence is commonly understood as any physical
assault, emotional or verbal abuse, or threatening, harassing, or coercive behavior in the
work setting that causes physical and/or emotional harm.” (ENA, 2010, p. 11) The
ENA has also been involved in political activities to strengthen penalties and develop
national standards for responses to violence.
Finally, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) definition of
violence is provided. It is not designed specifically for healthcare, but because it is
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federal law, an OSHA compliance officer can cite a hospital after a reported violent
event. OSHA states, “Workplace violence is any physical assault, threatening behavior,
or verbal abuse occurring in the work setting. A work place may be any location either
permanent or temporary where an employee performs any work related duty." This
includes, but is not limited to, buildings and surrounding perimeters including parking
lots and field locations, as well as clients’ homes and travel to and from work
assignments. OSHA provides specific examples, such as rape and shootings, as well as
more general examples, such as inappropriate remarks and threats. Interestingly,
interpretation of violence can be different for employers, employees, and witnesses.
(OSHA, 2012)
OSHA defines risk in the form of permissible exposure limits based on scientific
research. They do not attempt to examine how much violence, aggression or abuse is
permissible. Employers should take caution because this definition allows an individual
employee to complain to OSHA based on their personal definition. There is also no
method to enforce or control many of the examples in this definition. (NIOSH, 2002)
Inconsistencies and conflicts, such as those presented in these definitions, manifest
themselves in a care provider’s decision whether to complete an incident report for an
event. If there is a witness, that witness may influence the decision. However, if only the
care provider and the patient or visitor is involved, then uncertainty can cause nonreporting. For reporting purposes, a hospital may not have a written definition of
violence. Hospitals often defer to a Risk Management concept that anything out of the
ordinary should be on an incident report. How is a care provider to determine if
aggression, abuse or even violence is out of the ordinary given the specific set of
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circumstances and the emotional state of the patient or visitor? Care providers' personal
histories, cultures, races, education levels, environments, and states of mind at the time
may influence their decision. In fact, the numbers of incidents reported are far below
those acknowledged during studies.
Reporting and Increases of Violence
Reports of violence in hospitals are limited to recent history. Bryan Warren,
President-Elect of the International Association of Healthcare Safety and Security, stated
for the media after the shooting of a transplant surgeon in Orlando, Florida, in May 2011,
“Hospitals at one time were much like churches and schools, and were considered
somewhat sacred. Unfortunately, that’s not the case anymore.” (Shrieves, 14) The
Journal of Healthcare Protection Management provides additional support for this
viewpoint (1998, 43). This report describes hospitals as once revered places of healing
and caring. Healthcare professionals have lost the reverent and protected status they
historically held. Burgess in 1994 states: “Violence in America is increasing. It has
moved from the home to community and into the workplace, and it has exacted a
staggering toll of victims. Violence is occurring even in formerly protected and
sacrosanct environments, such as schools, hospital, and places of worship.” (Platt &
Mays, 1998) The Journal of Health Care Protection Management conducted crime
surveys of hospitals in 2000/2001 and in 2005. The 2000-2001 crime survey indicates
patients committed 6% percent of crimes in hospitals, while the 2005 survey indicated
patients committed 29% of crimes. The crimes mentioned in both surveys were simple
assaults.
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The Florida Society for Healthcare Security, Safety, and Emergency Management
Professional Conference focused on violence for 2011. Caroline Ramsey-Hamilton, a
Risk Management, and Security Consultant who has done work for the Joint
Commission, presented why she believes violence is increasing in hospitals:
1.

Doctors are no longer thought of as “Gods.” This means they are more easily
blamed when a patient’s condition deteriorates.

2. Hospitals are now regarded as businesses. This perception has been aggravated
by television as well as by the effects of the recession on jobs and the loss of
health insurance.
3. There is lack of respect and resources (funding) for hospital security departments.
Rather than being seen as a crucial protection for the hospital staff and patients,
many security departments are chronically underfunded and used for a variety of
non-security functions, such as making bank deposits for hospital gift shops.
Ramsey-Hamilton also points out that Security Directors' duties have changed from
what was historically internal security to include:
•

managing contract staff,

•

de-escalating violent patients,

•

performing risk assessments to prevent infant abduction,

•

operating valet and parking garages,

•

collecting and handling cash from valet and parking garages,

•

coordinating landing and departure of helicopters,

•

training law enforcement to sit with prisoners,

•

enforcing visitor control programs,
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•

assisting employees with domestic violence,

•

investigating harassment claims, and

•

handling risk management investigations and claims.

Her experience indicates that while the duties have grown the budgets have not kept pace
with the expansion. (Ramsey-Hamilton, 2011)
De-Escalation and Self-Defense Training
Several studies have suggested that de-escalation and self-defense training maybe
successful in providing care staff the tools and confidence to reduce and prevent
escalation of violence by patients or visitors. They recommend de-escalation and selfdefense training based on anecdotal reports, questionnaires, and surveys. Several suggest
actual implementation of an intervention and qualitative testing.
•

The National Advisory Council on Nurse Education and Practice
(NACNEP) recommends offering violence prevention and management
training in the workplace and keeping violence and security issues on the
radar screen of risk managers in health care facilities. (NACNEP, 2005)

•

Laura Sofield and Susan W. Salmond studied verbal abuse and care staff
turnover. They stated that, “Through education and policy
implementation, an organization can effectively empower its nurses to
eliminate verbal abuse.” (Sofield and Salmond, 2003, p. 37)

•

The Service Employees International Union and the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees had the Department of Labor
& Industries, Safety and Health Assessments and Research Prevention
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perform research into violence and recommended providing for adequate
facility staffing to ensure that all staff attend de-escalation, restraint, and
containment training.
•

Italian research at the Padua University Hospital, School of Nursing, into
violence, aggression prevention, and management strategies for violence
in European renal units concluded that violence prevention and
management strategies are not widely implemented in Europe.
Dissemination of information about prevention and management of
violence aggression is vital. (2010)

•

The Emergency Nurses Association in 1994 recommended mandatory
annual training to recognize and defuse potentially violent situations.

•

The Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI) in 2005 recommended
each hospital perform a violence risk assessment and management training
including techniques for identification, de-escalation, and response to
violence.

•

The two most important factors in determining a clinician's confidence
when managing aggression are training and use of prevention and
intervention strategies. (Martin T. & Daffern M., 2006)

•

Participants’ evaluation of aggression training supported such training as a
durable, positive change in care providers’ confidence to handle difficult
situations. (Collins 1994, Beech & Leather, 2003)

•

Tampa General Hospital emergency department requires annual deescalation and self-defense training. While emergency departments are
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generally recognized as the most violent part of a hospital, the TGH ED
did not record as many violent episodes as some other care units.
The greatest weakness in the literature reviewed and in most studies of violence in
hospitals is the method of data collection. Erickson in 2000 performed a review of health
care assault research and concluded it was subject to retrospective recall resulting in bias
due to subjective memory. Hospital administrators are careful decision makers and need
facts to support a problem and make the best decision for addressing the problem. This
study was experimental and provided quantitative evidence.
Conclusion
As this literature review has illustrated, developing a method to reduce and
prevent violence on hospital care units is exigent. Widely publicized extreme violence is
not indicative of actual, routine, violence in hospitals. The public has not been provided
the frequency, severity or harm from violence committed by patients and visitors on care
units. Studies support that such routine violence holds dire consequences for care
providers. Constructs, theories and models reviewed provide the basis for development
and implementation of the intervention proposed in this study. Finally, several previous
studies recommended implementation of de-escalation and self-defense training and
monitoring of the results. This study will attempt to perform that function.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The methodology for this study was formulated to answer why the
research is important, how the research will be conducted, what data will be collected,
and what particular methods will be utilized for analysis. The importance of this study
was demonstrated when TGH Nursing staff approached hospital leadership with their
concerns about violence. They stated that violence seemed to be increasing, was
impacting their ability to provide quality patient care, and contributing to nursing
retirement.
Research was initiated by developing an intervention utilizing violence theory and
constructs. A presentation was developed to increase care provider sensitivity, and to
provide verbal and physical methods to de-escalate or escape violence. The sensitivity
and awareness section of the training was developed to improve the attitude and ability of
care providers to anticipate violent tendencies of patients and visitors. De-escalation
taught both nonverbal and verbal methods to calm, display respect, and encourage
continual dialog. The self-defence portion provided basic techniques of escaping the
most common forms of physical contact by patients and visitors, beginning with methods
to seek assistance and understanding the importance of identified escape routes. Next
was demonstration of and practicing escapes from arm grams, clothing grabs, hair pulls,
and blocking punches. The physical portion was designed to increase self-confidence
and encourage care providers to attempt verbal de-escalation as well as self protection
and escape, if necessary.
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Nursing Administration was provided eight units with the highest number of Code
Gray reports to choose experimental and comparison units for the research. It was
decided that two units would be experimental due to the number of nurses to be trained
and some special requirements requested. Nursing Administration required all training
be conducted during normal department meetings and no overtime or call in pay be
utilized for the training. The managers of the recommended units still had to volunteer
their units for participation. The remaining six units were suggested to be averaged for
the comparison. The average was to eliminate the possibility that one unusual disruptive
patient would skew the comparison.
Security continued to record events after the presentation. Monthly, the
researcher reviewed all reported violence. No special visits were made to either
experimental or comparison units by the researcher during the year after the intervention.
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Figure 3.1: Baseline Code Grays per Patient Comparisons
Theory Driven Model Study Design
This study was designed incorporating the Theory Driven Model developed by
Chan in 1994. He proposed that a theory be developed first, followed by a hypothesis
and questions based on expectations of the theory (Donaldson, 2003, p. 29). The theory
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for this study is that violence on a care unit can be reduced by care providers’ actions.
The hypothesis for this study is that de-escalation and self-defense training can reduce
violence on a hospital unit. The training intervention was application of a 60-minute
presentation to at least 85% of care providers on a hospital unit, utilizing actual event
examples and hands on self-defence techniques.
The critical measurement for this study was the number of times security was
called for assistance and an event report was generated. The event reports for twelve
months before the intervention of each unit was used for historical comparisons. The
collection of event reports for all other units during the twelve months after the
intervention provided information to determine if any hospital-wide changes not
anticipated or controlled for occurred. Hospital-wide data provided a baseline for
stability of the hospital during the research. The six comparison units’ number of Code
Grays was averaged to reduce the possibility that one-time events affected the data. The
emergency department and the mental health units were excluded from this research
because of their dissimilarity to the other units.
Hypothesis Review
µ = the number of calls to security
µ1 = the number of calls for security assistance from Comparison Units
µ2 = the number of calls for security assistance from the Experimental Units
Null hypothesis

Ho: µ1 = µ2

Alternative hypothesis

Ha: µ2 ≠ µ1
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Method to Test Hypothesis
This study is applied research to test a method believed to reduce violence on
patient care units in hospitals. A successful outcome would be a change in violence on
experimental units compared to their historical trends and concurrent data with similar
units. De-escalation and self-defense training was presented to the experimental units
,and those numbers were compared with numbers from the comparison units. Completed
Code Gray critique forms determined the number of events reported per unit. This same
reporting process has been in place for over 15 years.
Similar processes are in place at all hospitals. This method for testing an
intervention can be duplicated at most hospitals, utilizing existing employees and
processes. Security event reports may be different but a reflection of the frequency of
events is captured by having reports. Care units routinely have meetings, so an
intervention that can be performed during these meetings causes little or no disruption to
patient care. Histories and concurrent data are relatively easy to organize and tabulate.
Reductions of violence in any amount would satisfy most hospital administrators if there
is little or no expense associated with the reduction. In addition, there can be a positive
employee morale factor associated with a formal decision to measure and reduce
incidents of violence.
Historical baseline data was used as the criteria for change. Outliers to the data
indicated a non-parametric statistical analysis was appropriate. The non-parametric
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks was performed using SPSS software to determine differences
within the units over time. The Mann-Whitney U Test was utilized to evaluate the
comparison and experimental units. The statistical significance factor of P<0.05 was
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accepted. Scatter plots were developed to provide a visual reference. Line charts were
developed to show trending. Regression analysis was utilized from the SPSS 20.0
program because of the small number of samples and the non-parametric distribution.
The Poisson regression model was used for two comparisons: a) the number of events per
month for the year before the training with the number of events after the training per
unit, and b) any differences between number of events per month after the intervention
between comparison and experimental units.
Study Questions
1. Does a time trend exist regarding reported violence at the hospital before or
after the training?
2. Does a time trend exist regarding the reported violence on the experimental
units before or after the training?
3. Does a time trend exist regarding the reported violence on the comparison
units before or after the training?
4. Will the data collected for one year before and after on the intervention units
indicate any change in number of reported violent events?
5. Will there be a difference between the reported number of Code Grays on the
experimental units and comparison units.
Assumptions of the Study
This study contains the following assumptions:
•

Care providers at TGH understand to call a Code Gray when they feel
threatened and need security assistance.
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•

Without some intervention, care providers will report events without change
as they have historically.

•

Event reports are an indicator of actual number of events occurring on care
units.

•

Staff and patients on units reporting above average Code Grays are similar to
those on other units.

•

Aggression, abuse, and violence on units are similar in causation but random
per location.

•

No harm will come to patients, visitors or care providers resulting from this
study.

•

Patient care staff on the intervention or comparison units will attend no similar
de-escalation or self-defense training during the study.

•

Staffing mix and per patient ratios will not change during this study.

•

Management of the patient care units will not change during this study.

•

Patient types and unit services will not change during the study.

•

Security will not change responses to events.
Process Study as Quality Improvement Activity

The Problem Patient Committee utilized several quality improvement processes to
understand violence on patient care units. The committee and this researcher had the
support and approval of TGH administration to design an intervention, present this
intervention on patient care units, and then compare the results with both the history of
the same units and with the data collected simultaneously from comparison units. This
approval and support made it possible to use the experimental design for this study.
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The quasi-experimental design contributes to the internal validity, which is
crucial to demonstrate if the intervention is associated with any observed changes. The
change in the number of Code Gray calls was the variable measured - the indicator of
effectiveness. The experiment tested whether participants in the intervention made fewer
event reports during the year after the training, and if those who did not participate
continued to make the same average number of event reports as before, or as the trend for
the unit.
The intervention was a 60-minute presentation. Limiting the time to 60 minutes
made it possible without requiring overtime or changing care providers’ schedules. The
time limit was a practical consideration for the study to be replicated on other units and at
other hospitals. No other intervention described as de-escalation or self-defense is
currently offered in this format. Existing commercially offered violence prevention
programs require several days of training.
To control for confounding effects, data was collected for all patient care units
before, during, and after the intervention. This data signaled any uncontrolled variables
and helped determine if any trends on other units changed or developed.
The de-escalation and self-defense training presented was similar to a program
that has been presented in the TGH Emergency Department for over ten years. While
ERs are traditionally ranked first in frequency of violent events in hospitals across the
nation, the TGH ER has decreased its rank to between fifth and eighth since the
institution of this training program. Since such a dramatic decrease may have been in
part due to the intervention training, administration was receptive to the possibility of
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adapting it to and testing a similar approach on care units. This is the first such training to
patient care staff at TGH.
No definition of violence was supplied or implied to care providers who
experienced the training or to those on comparison units. The comparability of historical
data to post-intervention data depended on leaving each patient care provider with their
own internal understanding of what constitutes violence.
Application to the Systematic Methodology Process
5. Analysis of the
data to determine if
results adequate for
application on other
patient care units.

1. Discovery of
frequency and
severity of violence
occuring on patient
care units .

Refinement of the
intervention.

2. Literature review,
discussions with
other hositals, and
review of historical
data for possible
causes and
solutions.

4. Implementaton of
the intervention,
collection of data
and review of
process.

3. Development of
hypothesis, and
intervention.
Development of
method to test
hypothesis and
implementation.

Figure 3.2: The Logical and Systematic Methodology Process
This study was applied research with the desired outcome to develop a method of
reducing violence on patient care units in all hospitals. A successful outcome would be
an impact of the intervention on experimental units as compared to control units. The
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primary method of determining a successful outcome was quantitative. The number of
events occurring before and after the intervention on participating units and other hospital
control units was compared utilizing Wilcoxon Signed Ranks and Poisson Regression.
Changes in the percentage of physical and verbal events were compared before and after
the training.
Application of Methods, Models and Theories
Three quality improvement methods were utilized. These included Stakeholder
Analysis, Ishikawas Diagram and Logic Modelling. These models provided guidance
for the development of the training.
Stakeholder Analysis
Trying to understanding each stakeholder’s concerns allows insight into different
types of prevention of, mitigation of, and response to violent events. This method of
analysis identifies shared concerns of and solutions for various shareholders. It also
points to specific concerns unique to a stakeholder. This process was performed by
actually talking with patients, their family members, and other persons on the care units.
There were discussions with administrators and hospital human resource staff to
determine their thoughts on how violence influences their duties. Several of those
questioned provided similar concerns for their safety and the possible impact on patient
care. Some of the care providers pointed out they have to perform a balancing act with
some patients because they know that if they curse, scream, and threaten nurse they get
quicker service or special attention. Care providers realize how unfair this is to other
patients yet sometimes respond because they it is the easiest way to calm the situation.
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Table 3.1: Evaluation Stakeholders and Related Concerns
Stakeholders

Concerns

Patient Care Providers

Personal injury, fear of injury, anxiety due to
aggression and abuse

Patients

Reduced patient care staff, quality of care
issues, legal issues

Patient Families

Quality of care issues, legal issues, lack of
patient care staff

Hospital administrators

Regulatory concerns of staff protection, duty to
provide a safe workplace, quality of care impact
and reduced patient care staff or fearful staff,
reputation of hospital, increased costs due to
turnover and rising job position costs

Patient Care providers families

Anxiety about family members being harmed

Hospital patient care recruiters

Increases difficulty in recruitment and increases
need for more recruitment as a result of
retirement or moving staff

Hospital security departments

Responding to and protecting patient care
increases need yet also increases fear of injury
to security staff

Insurance companies

Costs of injuries to staff and others, increased
hospitalization time costs

Media

High interest stories attract media attention and
harm hospital reputations, media maybe
manipulated to cover dramatic but not proven
events

General society

Fear, anxiety, violence destabilizes public
comfort level and reduces quality of life for all
persons, loss of respect for patients and patient
care providers

51

Ishikawas Diagram of Hospital Violence
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Figure 3.3: Ishikawas Diagram

Logic Model
Logic Models are used to understand how programs function. They help identify
inputs, activities, and outcomes. Based on research, interviews, group discussions, and
data analysis, the researcher developed the following logic model. The logic model is on
the following page.
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Table 3.2: Logic Model to Examine Violence on a Patient Care Unit
Inputs

Activities

Outputs

Patient care
staff
exposed

Review of
environment to
eliminate
possible
weapons

Number of
reported
patient events

Continued
funding for
staff,
facility,
supplies,
education,
and
equipment

Provide
visibility to for
observation of
violence
Develop rapid
response team
Sufficient
staffing for
response to
anticipated
threats
Provide deescalation/selfdefense
training
Monitor and
document all
violent events

Number of
injuries to
staff

Short Term
Outcomes
Possible
reduction in
stress of
patient care
staff when
patients act
out

Number of
repeat visits to
one patient

Possible
reduction in
number of
Number of de- reported
escalation and patient events
self -defense
Possible
classes held
reduction in
for patient
need for
care staff
security to
Number of
respond for
education /
assistance
prevention
activities and
number of
participants

Long Term
Outcomes
Possible reduction in
lost work time due to
patient care staff
injury
Possible reduction in
security and patient
care staff time
responding to
disruptive behavior
Possible improved
attitudes towards
patient care staff to
patients
Possible improvement
in staff morale.
Possible reduction in
overall violence,
disrespect, and
disruptive actions
Possible reduction in
turnover

This study combines “quasi-experimental design” utilizing two experimental and
averaging of six comparison units, historical and concurrent data comparisons with
several quality improvement processes to understand violence on patient care units.
Department Participation Process
Based on frequency of reported events from 2005 to 2009, units were presented to
Patient Care Leadership for inclusion as experimental or comparison units. Patient Care
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Leadership was advised to exclude any unit with anticipated changes in leadership,
location, patient types served, or staffing ratios.
Patient Care Leadership recommended two units for participation and six for
comparison. The six comparison units were averaged to reduce the possibility that an
outlier would skew the data. All 140-hospital units’ data was averaged as a baseline.
After Patient Care Leadership recommended a unit, the nurse manager of that unit
could refuse participation for operational reasons. Both invited managers chose to
participate. They agreed to schedule the de-escalation and self-defense training during
normal staff meetings and keep track of participation. No individual staff member was
interviewed, selected, or volunteered for this study. The two experimental units were
treated the same as all other units after the training. The unit staffs are similar in
background, education, income, and working environment. Many cultures, races, and
religions are represented on each unit. The units selected for the experimental deescalation and self-defense training was the Eldercare Unit and the Cardiac Unit.

Data Collection Process
There were no changes in the data collection process at TGH during the study.
The data collection process begins when a care staff member calls for security assistance.
The care provider calls a central code line and reports the code. The operator announces
a Code Gray overhead and the security dispatcher announces it over security radios.
Three to five security staff members respond to the scene. Care managers and leadership

54

may also respond to a Code Gray. Security completes the report and passes it to security
leadership for review and appropriate actions.
Data is collected using a Code Gray critique form. The same Code Gray critique
form has been used for the past ten years by security. It gathers information, which is
used to track and trend for quality improvement, excluding names of patients or staff
involved.
The data collected on these forms includes:
•

What was the time the code was called and security arrived--security is
held to a two minute response time anywhere within the almost 1.7 million
square feet of the facility

•

Did security hear the overhead announcement —for improved
communication to security staff

•

Were proper restraints available —if restraints are not quickly available,
additional officers are needed to hold down a patient

•

Was Tampa Police assistance requested—this tracks the number of times
such an event goes beyond the ability of a security officer

•

Did unit staff take a leadership role—to track their knowledge of
recommended patient control techniques

•

Did security officers wash their hands—to sustain infection prevention

To control for confounding variables, no additional training was provided to
security officers and no changes were made to their response expectations. They were
not informed that the Eldercare or Cardiac Units were participating in this study.
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Security did not increase surveillance or perform any other duties on these units that were
not performed prior to this study.
Code Gray Data Collection Tool
The Code Gray Critique form is designed to provide security leadership with
information needed to determine training effectiveness and improve systems for
responding to and reporting of aggression, abuse, or violence. Each quantitative data
question on the form is assigned 9 percentage points if a “yes” is indicated, and no points
when “no” is checked. Leadership totals these points to determine pass or fail and assign
follow-up. Sixty-five percent or above is passing, meaning that four “no” answers
constitutes a failed response. This system determines a level of performance expectation
of patient care providers, building systems, and security officers. Each failed responses
results in counseling of those responsible. Please see Appendix A.
Code Gray Investigation Procedures
The security supervisor and manager review these reports. If the quantitative
score is low, or if something is out of the ordinary in the opinion of the supervisor or
manager, it is brought to the attention of the director. All events that result in an injury
are investigated. Since it is the security officer responding who writes these reports,
further investigation begins with that officer. Events are tracked and trended. Discovery
of any commonalities is reported to the Security Subcommittee of the Environment of
Care Committee for follow-up. The event reports allow Security to determine how many
events occur on each shift, day, week, month, and unit. They often provide knowledge
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that is used to determine where card access, panic buttons, or cameras are needed to
protect staff.
The research project added one new step in the review of event reports. This was
the research advisory group, which was formed to determine if any adverse events
occurred because of this research.
Intervention Design
The intervention was designed utilizing four basic theories. Riches’ Violence
theory provided the basis for perception and sensitivity training. It also demonstrated the
impact on all persons involved in rather than just those directly impacted by the event.
Albert Bandura’s Social Learning theory provided the reason to require 85%
participation. This number was chosen to provide a good chance that there will always
be trained care providers for modelling of desired behaviour. John Dollard’s Frustration
Aggression theory pointed out situational awareness and awareness of actions of patients
and visitors that could indicate growing anger. Recognition of both provides the
caregiver with an opportunity for de-escalation before a situation becomes violent.
Training is divided into three parts. These parts intertwine both logic and emotion
to impact the differing personalities of care providers. The first part of the presentation
appeals to empathy by participants. It explores the possible reasons that a patient or
visitor becomes aggressive, abusive or violent, discussing fears, anxieties, and worries of
patients and visitors. Information about how different cultures and religions traditionally
respond to grief is explained. Family dynamics and stressors to be aware of are
examined.

Actual events on their unit, or well-known events from other units, are used
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so that they can identify with such situations. Material is presented such that care
providers accept they might do the same thing in a similar situation.
Discussion continues regarding how everyone is influenced in a situation by their
own perceptions, emotions and fears. Examples are provided of care providers whose
actions escalated rather than calmed a situation. This part of the presentation is designed
to move perspective from personal to situational, thereby removing or reducing what is
commonly known as the “fight or flight” reflex. When the context of an event changes to
situational, it is easier for a care provider to stay composed and objective about it. In
contrast, when an event is considered personal, often unintended and undesirable
behaviours emerge, such as bullying or grandstanding. (Stewart and Strathean, 2002)
Support systems for patient care staff are explained. This portion ends with how
listening, respecting, providing information, and showing empathy without putting
oneself at risk can reduce or prevent escalation.
In the second portion of the presentation, de-escalation techniques provide a
prescriptive method of response. These techniques can be reasonably trusted to provide
outcomes which maintain self respect and status of the care provider while seeking to
calm and meet the needs of the patient or visitor. The acronym "HEAT" is used to
remind the care giver: Hear the person out without interruption, show Empathy,
Apologize for anything inappropriate (without agreeing with any statements), and Take
some action. Since the care provider may not be able to provide what the patient or
visitor wants, they are taught how to refuse politely and provide realistic options. They
then allow the patient or visitor to make the choice. Care providers are encouraged to
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make a modest gesture to reinforce that they care, such as bringing a blanket, pillow, or
soft drink to the visitor or patient.
The third portion of the intervention is hands-on self-defence. During this
portion, the atmosphere is kept “light” and non-threatening. Stated goals are selfprotection, escape and assistance. No offensive or aggressive actions, such as hitting or
kicking, are demonstrated. Individual respect and dignity must be protected in
techniques presented. Therefore, techniques to stun, shock, facilitate release, block, and
escape are demonstrated and practiced.
The effectiveness of this portion of the presentation relies on active participation
by every attendee, and trust and respect of the presenter. One technique for earning trust
quickly is for the facilitator to identify the largest, strongest member of the group and
volunteer that person to pretend to be the perpetrator. This shows the participants the
facilitator’s confidence in the techniques and adds credibility to the presentation.
Participants have to believe that they can, with practice, perform the technique, and it will
work if they are attacked by a larger and stronger adversary. The facilitator may need to
employ humour to reduce tension and allow participants to accept personal errors. The
presentation is normally noisy, with many people talking and practicing at the same time.
There should be challenges to techniques and questions from participants. Both physical
and verbal understanding should be solicited by the presenter. During the physical
activities, the presenter must carefully monitor the energy levels and attitudes of the
participants. No one should be allowed to act dangerously or angrily during the practice.
The facilitator must listen to feedback from the participants as well as monitor their nonverbal cues to prevent injuries.
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The presentation ends by providing care providers an understanding of how to
direct security responders during such events. Code words and methods security use are
explained. Understanding that security is normally at an event in less than two minutes,
and that three to five officers are required to respond, is reassuring. Care providers must
believe that security will subdue the violent person and calm the situation quickly and
quietly.
Internal Controls for Validity
Numbers of actual requests for assistance were compared with historical and
concurrent data. Actual care provider turnover and patient satisfaction scores were
analyzed. The following threats to internal validity were recognized, and efforts made to
control them:
•

Construct variation – participants understanding the presentation differently
Mitigation plan:
− Asking for feedback during and after the presentation to demonstrate desired
understanding and allow for better refinement of information.
− Using much of the emergency department and charge nurse training material, this
has proven over time to be clear and understandable. This training material has
also proven to be linguistically and culturally acceptable to the care providers.
− Performed training with a power point format to maintain as much uniformity as
possible in the presentations.

•

Reactivity – participants may respond differently based on the way the speaker
presents (body language, tone etc...).
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Mitigation plan:
− The same researcher performed all the interventions
− The same terminology, examples, and demonstrations were used in each session
•

Seeking Approval of Authority– participants may agree with the speaker to gain
favored status.
Mitigation plan:
-

After the presentation, the presenter did not visit the intervention units or discuss
the intervention with any member of those units until final data collection.

•

The researcher responded to codes on all units the same.

Selection Bias – the researcher could choose participants who are favorable to the
research. Mitigation plan:
Patient Care Leadership performed selection of units for participation in
training. They were given information on units with the largest number of events
for the past five years and trends. The Emergency Department and Mental Health
Unit were excluded from the list because of their marked differences from other
patient care units. The Cardiac Care Unit had historically been in the top five
units requesting security assistance. The Eldercare Unit had just made the top six
lists for the past two years.
Statistical Methodology
Once the experimental and comparison groups had been determined, methods to

compare these units before the training were established. There were 12 samples for the
experimental units and low numbers of events, so a non-parametric comparison was

61

utilized. Kruskall-Wallis provided the following data for the comparison and
experimental units. This data does not show any change over time.
Table3.3: Kruskall-Wallis Comparison
Units

Median

Range

Comparison (n=72)

3

0-14

Cardiac Care (n=12)

2.5

1-7

Eldercare (n=12)

3.5

0-10

This table indicated there was similarity before the training for the comparison and
experimental units. Scatter plots and line graphs were developed to visualize the spread
and trending. These same methods were utilized after the year of monitoring was
completed. In addition, performing Wilcoxon Signed Ranks determined differences
within groups. Changes in the rate of events over time Regression modeling was utilized
to determine if there was an increasing or decreasing trend, and the statistical significance
of any such trend. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for all
statistical analysis.
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Chapter 4: Results
The study was designed to investigate the impact of de-escalation and selfdefense training for care providers on reducing occupational violence. It compared and
contrasted two units where de-escalation and self-defense training was performed with
their historical trends, six similar units, and the hospital overall average. The six similar
units acted as comparison units. The hospital overall average was used to determine
events that might affect the entire study. The eight units selected as experimental and
comparison were determined by totaling reports from 2005 to 2009 for all hospital units.
These eight units excluded the psychiatric and emergency departments, as they are
dissimilar to other units.
Code Gray Baseline Data
Table 4.1: Baseline Data from Event Reports
Code Grays from 2005 to 2010
Possible reporting units
Average annual total Code Grays for the hospital
Average annual Code Grays per unit from 2005 to 2010
Number of units reporting Code Grays every year
Total Code Grays of 16 departments reporting annually
Percentage of every year group to total
Average Code Grays per 16 annual reporting units
Number of units reporting Code Grays from 2005 to 2010
Units reporting in 2005
Units reporting in 2006
Units reporting in 2007
Units reporting in 2008
Units reporting in 2009
Units reporting in 2010
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1695
140
282.5
5.46
16
1350
80 %
84.38
54
30
26
30
42
34
35

Sixteen units comprised 80% of the Code Grays; they were from trauma,
intensive care, psychiatric and emergency departments. The highest number of Code
Grays on one unit was 268.
Table 4.2: Baseline Data for Participating Units
Experimental
Units
2005
5A-Cardiac
23.0
6C-Elderly
8.0
Comparison
Units
5C
10.0
5K
NA
6A
48.0
8C
10.0
8F
6.0
9A
43.0

2006
24.0
11.0

2007
26.0
9.0

2008
23.0
18.0

2009
27.0
44.0

Annual
2010 Average Total
46.0
28.2
169
39.0
21.5
129

21.0
NA
22.0
27.0
7.0
22.0

20.0
NA
57.0
27.0
8.0
41.0

18.0
5.0
62.0
25.0
14.0
53.0

17.0
32.0
44.0
54.0
23.0
38.0

17.0
38.0
35.0
61.0
41.0
48.0

17.2
25.0
44.7
34.0
16.5
40.8

103
76
268
204
99
245

The Cardiac Unit experienced 169 Code Grays and Eldercare 129 from January
2005 to July 2010. The average annual Code Grays for the Cardiac Unit was 28.17, and
for Eldercare was 21.50. The Eldercare unit changed from a normal med surge unit to
Eldercare in 2008.
Statistics Adjusted for Patient Days
Before proceeding to data analysis, the researcher investigated whether any
differences in the numbers of Code Grays were due to the numbers of patients served.
The figure below demonstrates that there was an increase in Code Grays per patient over
time for the entire hospital.
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Figure 4.1: Baseline Code Grays per Patient Comparisons
The following Table and Figures demonstrate that, even when adjusted for patient days,
the data remains stable.
Table 4.3: Overall Rate Statistics –Codes per Patient Days on Units
n-months of data

Before

After

Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks
0.684

Paired ttest
0.437

Comparison Units
(n=72)

0.004
(0.004)

0.004
(0.004)

Cardiac Unit (n=12)

0.002
(0.001)

0.003
(0.003)

0.875

0.565

Eldercare Unit (n=12)

0.006
(0.004)

0.003
(0.002)

0.050

0.026
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Comparison Units

Intervention

Cardiac Unit
Eldercare Unit

Figure 4.2: Patient Day Rate Comparisons

These units are at 90 to 100 % capacity at all times. This comparison indicated the
appropriateness of using actual data numbers for the remainder of the analysis.
Histogram Monthly Results
Monthly, the data was collected, reviewed, plotted, and placed on a line graph for
visualization. The results are explained in the following: a histogram of monthly
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averages, scatter plots, line graphs, Wilcoxon box plots, and comparison tables of
Regression Analysis.
The first figure is the histogram. The hospital average takes the total number of
events, including both comparison and experimental units, and divides this by the 140
possible units where Code Grays could occur.

Monthly Averages
3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0
Hospital

Comparison Units

Cardiac

Before

Figure 4.3: Before and After Averages
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After

Eldercare

This visualization demonstrates that the average number of Code Grays per hospital
department fell; the comparison units remained stable, the Cardiac Care unit increased
and the Eldercare unit had a decrease.
Next, the monthly number of events was divided by the number of patients and
placed on scatter plots. The trend lines were the first indication of changes before and
after.

Training

Figure 4.4: Scatter Plot 1: Comparison Units—trend line remains stable

Training

Figure 4.5: Scatter Plot 2: Cardiac—slight increase maybe due to outliers
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Training

Figure 4.6: Scatter Plot 3: Eldercare—decrease steady after intervention
Line Graphs were developed to visualize monthly changes in the number of
events. Trend lines were added for comparison with the scatter plot trends and include
the entire 24 months of the study.
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Figure 4.7: Line Graph of Comparison Units Averages
The comparison units are increasing slightly during the year before and after the training.
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Experimental Units Combined
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Figure 4.8: Line Graph of Experimental Units Averages

Eldercare Trendline
12.00
10.00
8.00

Training

6.00
4.00
2.00

Jul-09
aug
sep
oct
nov
dec
Jan-10
feb
mar
apr
may
jun
jul
aug
sep
oct
nov
dec
Jan-11
feb
mar
apr
may
jun

0.00

Figure 4.9: Line Graph of Eldercare Unit
This Trendline demonstrates a decline. Events from June 2010 stay below the four
events per month and smooth out around two.
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Cardiac Unit Trendline
12.00

Training

10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00

Cardiac

jun

may

apr

feb

mar

jan

dec

nov

oct

sep

aug

jul

jun

may

apr

mar

feb

jan

dec

nov

oct

sep

aug

jul

jun

0.00

Linear (Cardiac)

Figure 4.10: Cardiac Unit Trendline
When the major increases occurred on the Cardiac Unit, an investigation was
performed to determine if something had happened that would threaten safety of care
providers on that unit. A meeting was held with the Unit Manager. It was discovered
that many in the meeting had not attended the training. When the group was asked why
the number had increased, they did not realize they had increased. Those who had
attended the training had attempted to explain the process to those who did not it seems to
have increased awareness, without providing the tools for intervention and this could
have caused the increase. This type of increased sensitivity has been reported in other
studies.
Similar Results to First Six Months of Cardiac Unit
Arnetz & Arnetz in 2000 performed a study with somewhat similar results to the
Cardiac Care Unit. Their hypothesis stated that a group that attended a controlled,
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practical intervention program would report better awareness of risks, improved handling
of aggressive situations and less exposure to violent incidents. Their results did indicate
improved risk awareness and better knowledge of how to handle violence compared with
a baseline. There was an increase in reported events, similar to the Cardiac unit of this
study. The Arnetz & Arnetz study indicated the increased reports were a result of
increased awareness and attention paid to those making reports. This is very possibly the
same reason for the increased number of reports on the Cardiac unit. While there seemed
to be an increase of awareness on the Cardiac unit, the care providers did not receive any
increased attention from security or administration. The data was utilized for the
remainder of the study with this taken into consideration.
At the completion of the 12 months of data collection, a new Kruskall-Wallis
chart was prepared to compare with the “before” training data.
Table 4.4 Second Kruskall-Wallis Chart
Units
Comparison (n=72)
Cardiac Care (n=12)
Eldercare (n=12)

Median

Range

2
2.5
2

0-12
0-11
0-4

Table 4.5 Combined Before and After Kruskall-Wallis Tables
Units

Before

After

P-value

Median
Comparison 3.0

Range
0-14

Median
2.0

Range
0-12

0.720

Cardiac

2.5

1-7

2.5

0-11

0.651

Eldercare

3.5

0-10

2.0

0-4

0.028

72

This comparison indicated the possibility of a significant reduction in the
Eldercare Unit. Further analysis was performed to clarify this indication.
Wilcoxon Before and After
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks was chosen to show the differences between the
comparison and experimental units because it makes no assumptions of the underlying
statistical distribution and is non-parametric. The star and circle indicate extreme and
abnormal outliers removed from the data for comparison.
There is little change in the hospital average; it stays close to “0”. The Cardiac

Cardiac Care

Figure 4.11: Overall Hospital vs. Experimental Units
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Eldercare

The Cardiac unit is showing a general trend towards decrease, but two
measurements that showed a dramatic increase are pulling the distribution in the upwards
direction. The Eldercare Unit is mostly below the line and shows the clearest pattern of
change.

Figure 4.12: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Before and After for Cardiac
Non-parametric paired (pre-post testing) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p=0.651
(NS). There appears to be no change on the Cardiac Unit.

Figure 4.13: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Before and After for Eldercare
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The non-parametric paired (pre-post testing) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p=0.028 (SIG)
indicates a change for the Eldercare Unit.
P-Scores for Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
Comparison Group (median, range)
Before: 3 (0-14)
After: 2 (0-12)
Test: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
P=0.720
----------------------------------------------Cardiac (median, range)
Before: 2.5 (1-7)
After: 2.5 (0-11)
Test: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
P=0.651
---------------------------------------------Eldercare (median, range)
Before: 3.5 (0-10)
After: 2 (0-4)
Test: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
P=0.028
Table 4.6: Pre-Post Change Comparison (median, range)
Control
0 (-14 to 10)

5A
-1 (-4 to 9)

p-value
0.969

6C
-2.5 (-7 to 3)

p-value
0.061

Regression Analysis
There were several steps in the Regression Analysis. Model 1 combines 24 months of
data to view overall change. Model 2 compares the trend line slopes before and after the
training. Model 3 uses the comparison units as reference for changes in the experimental
units.
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Model 1
This model combines the data to determine if an overall change has occurred
during the twenty-four months.
a.

Assumes a Poisson distribution for outcomes

b. Codes are the dependent variable
c. Time is the independent variable, 1 to 24 months.
Table 4.7: Overall Change 24 Months
Parameter

Beta

95% Confidence
Interval (CI)
1.06-1.38
-0.02 to 0.007

Intercept
1.220
Time
-0.004
Omnibus test, p=0.491

p-value
<0.001
0.491

The beta is -0.004, indicating almost zero change during the study.
Model 2
This model compares the slope of the events the first twelve months with the
slope of the events for the second twelve months. This required the use of “spline
modeling” which allowed for the creation of two dummy variables.
a. One model was created for each of the units.
b. Independent variables were Codes Grays before the training, utilizing a
dummy variable of zero for codes after the training (Time_Before), and Code
Grays after the training, utilizing a dummy variable of zero for codes before the
training (Time_After).
c. The dependent variable was codes.
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Three tables are presented: Comparison Units, Cardiac Care and Eldercare
Table 4.8: Comparison Units
Parameter

Beta

95% CI

p-value

Intercept

0.970

0.77-1.17

<0.001

Time_Before
Time_After

0.037
0.028

0.009-0.066
-0.001 -0.057

0.010
0.060

Table 4.9: Cardiac Care Unit
Parameter

Beta

95% CI

p-value

Intercept

1.291

0.821 - 1.762

<0.001

Time_Before
Time_After

-0.026
-0.031

-0.099 -0.048
-0.106 – 0.044

0.497
0.415

Table 4.10: Eldercare Unit
Parameter

Beta

95% CI

p-value

Intercept

1.216

0.734 – 1.699

<0.001

Time_Before
Time_After

0.027
-0.083

-0.041 – 0.094
-0.171 – 0.005

0.436
0.065

When the year before the training is compared to the year after the training for each
individual unit, no statistically significant changes are observed.
Model 3
This model compares the experimental groups with the comparison group.
1.

Independent Variables:
a. Group (Comparison=reference, Cardiac Unit and Eldercare Unit)
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b. Time_ Before, Time_After
c. Interaction Term: Group*Time_Before, Group*Time_After (for slope
comparison over time for the units’ data)
2. Dependent variables: Code Grays
Table 4.11: Final Regression Statistics
Parameter
Intercept
Time_Before
Time_After
Group=Comparison
Group=Eldercare
Group=Cardiac Care
Interaction=Comparison
*Time_Before
Interaction=Eldercare
*Time_Before
Interaction=Cardiac
*Time_Before
Interaction=Comparison
*Time_After

Beta
0.970
0.037
0.08
REF
0.246
0.321
REF

95% CI
0.768 – 1.172
0.009 – 0.066
-0.001 – 0.057
REF
-0.277 – 0.769
-0.277 – 0.833
REF

P-value
<0.001
0.010
0.060
REF
0.356
0.219
REF

-.0.11

-0.084 – 0.062

0.774

-0.063

-0.142 – 0.016

0.118

REF

REF

REF

Interaction=Eldercare
*Time_After
Interaction=Cardiac
*Time_After

-0.111

-0.204 - 0.018

0.019

-0.059

0.139 – 0.021

0.15

Lines 7 to 9 above indicate there are no significant differences between the
comparison units and the experimental units. Lines 10 to 12 indicate that, compared to
the comparison units, Eldercare is exhibiting a statistically significant decrease. The
Cardiac Unit also shows a decrease, but fails to reach statistical significance.
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Final Statistical Model:
Y (Code Grays) = 0.970 (intercept) + 0.037 (Time_Before) + 0.028 (Time_After) + 0.246
(Eldercare) + 0.321 (Cardiac Unit) - 0.011 (Eldercare*Time_Before) – 0 .063 (Cardiac
Care*Time_After) – 0.111 (Eldercare*Time_After) – 0.059 (Cardiac*Time_After)
Physical and Verbal Comparisons
The percentage of physical to verbal events changed after de-escalation and selfdefense training. The control group maintained the same percentage of physical to verbal
events. In the experimental group, percentages of verbal events increased and physical
events decreased.

Comparision Units Percentages
% of verbal

% of physical

57

57

43

43

Before Combined Comparision Units

After Combined Comparison Units

Figure 4.14: Comparison Unit Verbal vs. Physical Percentages
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Experimental Units
% of verbal

% of physical
66

59

41
34

Before Combined Experimental Units

After Combined Experimental Units

Figure 4.15: Experimental Unit Verbal vs. Physical Percentages

Conclusions
•

Total Code Grays for TGH continued to increase during the 24 month
period of this study. The rate of increase slowed.

•

Monthly averages for the total hospital increased slightly.

•

Monthly averages for comparison units remained approximately the same.

•

Monthly averages for the Cardiac care unit increased by 1.5 codes per
month, however the trend was negative.
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•

Monthly averages for the Eldercare unit decreased by 2.5, and continued
to decline.

•

Wilcoxon indicated no significant change occurred on the Cardiac Unit, at
p=0.651.

•

Wilcoxon indicated that changes on the Eldercare unit were significant, at
p=0.028.

•

The first Poisson Regression Analysis compared overall change and did
not report significance.

•

The second Regression Analysis compared reports before the training to
reports after the training on each study unit. The results failed to reach
statistical significance.

•

The third Regression Analysis set the Comparison Units as the reference.
The comparison with the Cardiac Unit failed to find a statistically
significant difference. The comparison with the Eldercare unit indicated a
statistically significant p-value of 0.019.

•

The Eldercare Unit had nearly 50% fewer total Code Grays the year after
the de-escalation and self-defense training.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
The results of this study support the principle that de-escalation and self-defense
can reduce the number of times patient care units requested security assistance with
disruptive patients. There was no indication that events were occurring and not reported.
Reporting may have actually increased due to increased staff awareness. The increase in
verbal and decrease in physical events after the intervention suggests that care providers
may have been more successful in preventing physical violence. The divergent results
from the two experimental units indicate the need for stronger controls on participation
rates.
Strengths and Weaknesses of this Study
The strengths are primarily related to the ability of this study to be repeated.
•

Security staff remained blinded during the duration of the study

•

Meetings where care providers voiced strong concern for increasing aggression,
abuse, and violence on patient care units led to the study

•

The use of existing hospital systems and staff creates simplicity

•

Existing hospital departments can plan, implement and collect data for a study

•

No overtime cost for participation, no call in pay required, and training during
routine staffing maintains existing hospital operations and budgets

•

Actual event reports are not subjective to memory or participant bias

•

Data collected prior to training allows historical comparison
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•

Utilizing the entire hospital as part of the study provided data on stability of
baseline

•

Staffing ratios, patient types, locations, operating policies and procedures and
leadership were held stable during this study

The weaknesses are due to the necessity of assumptions and the difference of the research
hospital to other hospitals.
•

Care providers may have participated in other types of de-escalation and selfdefense classes during the study

•

External variables that could influence the study such as economic crisis, media
reports of violence, political or regulatory changes were unable to be controlled
during the study.

•

Unique size and location of TGH causes difficulty to generalize to other hospitals

•

No valid general baseline data or historical studies of violence in hospitals exist
for comparison

•

Assumptions
o Care providers understood to call a Code Gray when they felt threatened
and needed security assistance
o Care providers continued to report events as they had historically
o Event reports were a valid substitute for the actual number of events
occurring on care units
Recommendations for Future Research

•

Include variables such as care providers’ job satisfaction, unit turnover rates, and
patient satisfaction before and after training
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•

Present same training to new staff before they begin working on the unit

•

Improving the research design may include separating the types of incidents. The
Royal College of Nursing, London, has recommended events be categorized as
follows for research purposes:
o Swearing/bad language
o Being slapped/hit/punched
o Being spat at
o Abuse of a specially racial nature
o Having hair pulled
o Being bitten
o Sexual harassment or advances
o Being threatened or intimidated in any way
o Being physically taken hold of
o Facing threats of self-harm from the aggressor from noncompliance with demands
o Being pushed/shoved/grabbed
o Being kicked (Zarola, Leather, Barklamb, 2008)
o The barrier to the acquisition and accumulation of such data would
be the time it takes the security person to determine and document
relevant details ( Zarola, Leather, & Barklamb, 2008)
•

Develop standardized term and event definitions, training programs and
presentations for several hospitals

•

Conduct similar experiments at different size hospitals
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•

Develop acceptable cost benefit analysis criteria and perform before and
after research
Reasons for More Research

The consequences of hospital violence committed by patients and visitors harms
care providers and may hinder their ability to provide quality care. (Henderson, 2003)
The public, care providers and hospital administrators generally do not understand the
frequency or severity of patient and visitor violence. Increased research is needed to
provide policy and decision makers with valid information about issues, situations and
types of interventions that might contribute to prevention of violence. Increased research
is needed to inform the public of the impacts of such violence and to promote political
changes for the protection of patient care providers.
If research does not lead to improved working conditions for care providers,
regulatory agencies may become involved. The current trend for regulatory agencies is
results-oriented, as opposed to prescriptive. Such regulations emphasize rates as end
products, rather than methods by which to achieve rate reductions. Consequently,
hospitals that invest in cost-effective interventions before regulatory involvement may
find themselves ahead of their competitors in ways that can be both measured and
publicized.
In addition, labor unions use safety as a reason to gain a foothold in hospital. National
unions have worked with federal agencies to document the need for hospital actions to protect
care providers from patient and visitor violence. (McPhaul, Lipscomb, 2004) Hospital
administrators can promote research into patient and visitor violence if they wish to help prevent
unions from using it as a campaign issue.
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The American Nurses Association reports that the estimated average cost of each
physical assault is approximately $13,197. The increasing incidence trend is further
raising the cost of healthcare. (Grice, 2005) In the end, as is the case with most public
health measures, it may be far less expensive and more effective to prevent assaults on
health care providers rather than to react to and manage their consequences.
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Appendix A
Tampa General Hospital “Code Gray” Critique
Names of Response Team:__________ __________ __________ __________
__________ __________
Date____________ Time of code____________ Arrival Time ____________
Recall ____________ Bldg ____________ Floor/Unit____________
Yes
No
Comments
System Quantitative Data
Could the announcement be heard?

____ 9%

____

____________

Was proper restraints/equipment available? ____ 9%

____

____________

Employee Training
Was Security notified?

____

9%

____

____________

Was 7777 dialed?

____

9%

____

____________

Were there any injuries to personnel or to the patient?
____

9%

____

____________

Was TPD intervention required?

____

9%

____

____________

Did staff provide TEAM leadership?

____

9%

____

____________

Did Safety/Security respond?

____

9%

____

__________

Did any fixed post security respond?

____ 9%

____

__________

Did Nursing Administrator respond?

____ 9%

____

__________

____

__________

Response Team

Did all officers wash hands before and after the code?
____ 9%
Brief narrative of the situation
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
If arrival time to code is more than 2 minutes, please give an explanation on back.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Dispatcher___________________ Manager____________________________
Quantitative Score______________________
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